I have been thinking more on the debacle that NASA seems to be running trying to maintain a manned space presence. Read this wrap up on the CEV from the author of the Encyclopedia Astronautica which is pretty damning.
Although each contractor conducted thousands of pages of rigorous trade studies against NASA's proposed requirements, they came to very different conclusions. However there were some common themes identified by more than one contractor:
* The optimum CEV would have a mass of under 9 tonnes and a crew of four or less.
* The lowest cost launch solution would be to use existing expendable launch vehicles (Atlas V and Delta IV) or derivative. This would allow launch of the CEV on earth-orbit missions by a single booster existing ELV. Three-booster versions of existing ELV's could orbit elements of lunar or Mars expeditions.
* The most flexible and logical lunar exploration architecture was to assemble lunar expedition components at the L1 Earth-Moon Lagrangian point. This allowed unconstrained launch and landing schedules, and provided a permanent way station for not only lunar, but Martian exploration.
By the time the final CEV proposals were received, Mike Griffin had been appointed the new NASA Administrator. He saw that the CEV plan would realistically leave NASA with a half-decade gap between the retirement of the shuttle and the commencing of CEV flights. Griffin obtained White House backing to reject all of the contractor's proposals abandon the long, expensive, 'spiral' development process, and plunge ahead using existing technology and NASA's best judgment. On June 13, 2005, NASA announced the down-select of two contractors: Lockheed Martin and the team of Northrop Grumman and Boeing. However the selected contractors would only build a CEV to NASA's own design.
Phase 1 was now accelerated so that a single contractor would be selected without prototyping or flight-test in 2006, so that the spacecraft could be available by 2010 as a shuttle replacement. The crew requirement was increased to six, and CEV launch mass to 30 tonnes, meaning the CEV could only be launched atop a Shuttle-derived, NASA-operated launch vehicle. NASA's CEV configuration, as finally made public in late 2005, was called 'Apollo on steroids'. The CEV would be used initially to provide access to the International Space Station after the retirement of the Space Shuttle in 2010. Thereafter it would provide the earth return vehicle for missions to the moon (by 2020) or Mars (by 2030+?).
It looked like the errors of the original Apollo program would be repeated. A three-module spacecraft, as used successfully on Soyuz and Shenzhou, was rejected. Instead the sole crew habitat space would be the re-entry vehicle, which would be a 41% scaled up version of the Apollo command module. This would have over three times the internal volume and double the surface area of the Apollo capsule, but NASA claimed its mass could be limited to only 50% more than the Apollo design. Despite the increase in volume and mass, it would provide accommodation for only four to six crew (versus three to five in Apollo).
The service module was stubbier and lighter than the Apollo CSM, and powered by a liquid oxygen/methane engine. The same propellant combination would be used in the reaction control systems of both the command and service modules, the ascent stage of any later lunar lander, and the ascent stages of any Mars landers. The choice of this untried rocket propellant was driven by NASA plans to - maybe - generate methane from the Martian atmosphere on future manned expeditions. For NASA's lunar landing scenario, the CEV would be required to make only the Trans-Earth injection maneuver to bring the crew home. In the Apollo scenario, the CSM had to brake both the CSM and lunar module into lunar orbit, as well as make Trans-earth injection for the CSM.
The CEV would be launched into earth orbit by the Crew Launch Vehicle, a shuttle-derived two-stage rocket consisting of a single Shuttle RSRM solid booster as the first stage and a new second stage, 5.5 m in diameter, using Lox/LH2 propellants and powered by a single SSME.
By January 2006 NASA still had not released its revised baseline so that the prospective contractors could begin working on their final proposals for the down-select. The contradictions in NASA's homegrown design had become apparent even before the final specification could be released. Reportedly, the liquid oxygen/methane engines would be eliminated, replaced instead by toxic but proven storable propellant engines as used on Apollo and the Shuttle. The CEV's first flight had slipped to 2011 or 2012. NASA had lost one its main political supporters, Tom DeLay.
The selection of an Apollo-type configuration for the re-entry vehicle represented a step back sixty years. The original Apollo design, a NASA in-house concept, was inferior to contractor alternatives. The Soviets selected the Soyuz configuration (identical to the losing General Electric Apollo design) and had a configuration still in production fifty years later - and likely to continue to the middle of the 21st Century in the Chinese Shenzhou. Apollo, by comparison, remained in production only five years. In 2005, Northrop-Grumman again proposed a Soyuz-type design.
Other alternatives for Apollo were a variety of ballistic, lifting-body and winged configurations, any of which would have provided a fine basis for a manned spacecraft that could be recovered with horizontal landings. At least the excuse given in 1961 - that there was no time to pursue development of a winged vehicle and still make the end-of-the-decade lunar landing deadline - may have had some validity. But this made less sense in 2005, when Lockheed proposed a winged design based on forty years of intervening lifting body research and shuttle hypersonic flight experience.
Given that the original submission had been adhered to then the CEV would be launchable by the Atlas 5, Delta 4 or even the Ariane 5. This would have been the cheapest option. However to make as much pork as possible the US embarked on a Shuttle component re-use program that is now being completely rolled back in favour of more suitable components.
Consider that in 1966 there was a CLV then called the Saturn 1B that launched a Apollo capsule to orbit. It was used for the Skylab mission that was launched by the Saturn 5. Here are some details:
1973 May 14 - 17:30 GMT - Launch Site: Cape Canaveral . Launch Complex: LC39. Launch Pad: LC39A. Launch Vehicle: Saturn V. Model: Saturn V. LV Configuration: Saturn V SA-513.
* Skylab 1 Nation: USA. Program: Skylab. Payload: Skylab Orbital Workshop. Mass: 74,783 kg. Class: Manned. Type: Space station. Spacecraft: Skylab, Apollo ATM. Agency: NASA MSF. Perigee: 427 km. Apogee: 439 km. Inclination: 50.0 deg. Period: 93.2 min. COSPAR: 1973-027A. USAF Sat Cat: 6633. Decay Date: 11 July 1979.
Note the launch mass - 75 000 kg to LEO. Note the habitable volume "Volume: 361.00 m3". This was launched in one go by the Saturn V. The US had a HLLV and a CLV capsule in 1973 and this is what they want to return to in 2006? What about the trillions spent on the Shuttle and ISS which is smaller than Skylab?
This to me is a gigantic failure of imagination of NASA. Burt Rutan etal can fly a small spacecraft capable of holding 3 people to 100km for 20 million. This is less that the amount spent on the study to determine that the SSME was unsuitable for an expendable launcher. If they had listened to people (not me as I really know nothing) they could have avoided all the stuffing around.
Here are my predictions:
1. The CLV, if it does fly and does not end up a hanger queen, will be downsized and fly atop a Atlas 5 or Delta 4.
2. The Burt Rutan Virgin Galactic spaceplane will be in orbit before the CLV.
The final word belongs to Pausanius
The Incredible Shrinking CEV - 2006-02-02
NASA
is losing its battle against physics and common sense. Latest word is
that the CEV has shrunk down to 5 m diameter. The CLV Stick booster
configuration has gone from a four-segment SRB + SSME-powered second
stage to a five segment SRB + J-2S-powered second stage. So the
exhaustive 'draft final report', which provided hundreds of pages of
detailed justification why NASA ignored the recommendations of industry
in their CEV studies, is 'inoperative'. NASA is inevitably pushed to
the same conclusions that everyone else had come to.
The
next step will be to dump the CLV and use a Delta IV or Atlas V Medium
as the launch vehicle for earth orbit missions. It has to be emphasized
that the CLV is not sized to send the CEV toward the ISS. It is,
rather, designed to take the CEV plus 9.3 tonnes of propellant into
orbit to rendezvous with much larger lunar spacecraft. That 9.3 tonnes
of propellant has no other purpose but to send the CEV back from the
earth toward the moon at the end of a lunar orbit rendezvous mission.
For earth orbit missions, 6.3 tonnes of the propellant carried will
have no purpose at all. The NASA CEV design has no means for converting
this excess capacity into useful payload that can be delivered to the
station. NASA lamely states that it could be used for 'station reboost'
- but the propellant necessary for this is one tenth the amount
delivered.
So NASA continues its
jaw-droppingly proud tradition of putting useless kilograms of mass
into orbit at an expense of over $20,000 per kilogram. 117 shuttle
missions have sent the shuttle itself, at a mass of up to 120 tonnes,
into orbit and back. Net payload on each mission was only 20% of the
total. This means that NASA has orbited over 10,000 tonnes of payload
(the reusable shuttle) and brought it back to earth. The only purpose
for this amazing feat was to recover the engines. These engines have
been so un-reusable and so costly that they have cost more than just
using expendable J-2 or M-1 engines in their place on each launch.
10,000 tonnes - enough to orbit a cruiser. Imagine the space stations,
the lunar bases, the Mars expeditions that tonnage could have
translated into!
Let's consider if NASA
had not proceeded with the Shuttle, rather a lower-cost Saturn-derived
equivalent. That would translate into a Saturn II upper stage powered
by two 260-inch SRB's. Or it may have been cheaper and safer to just to
keep the two-stage version of the Saturn V in production. Either way,
those 113 missions would have cost no more than the same number of
shuttle missions, but have delivered four to five times the net payload
into orbit. Every one could have beeen accompanied by a nine-crew
reusable Big Gemini space capsule. This is not to mention that the
money NASA spent developing the shuttle and modifying LC39 would have
been saved, translating into even more launches during the 1970's
(which would have already established a moon base).
This
- of course - is unfair 20-20 hindsight. The evolution of the shuttle
from an all-reusable low-cost means of access to space to a misbegotten
hardly-reusable high-cost means of access to space has been well
documented. But it is clear that if NASA had gotten its all-reusable
two-stage shuttle developed, it would have been even more of an
economic disaster. For the design would have been cursed with the same
really-not-reusable SSME's, the same labor-intense 'recycling' after
each mission, not to mention the still-unknown effects of operating
aluminium propellant tanks through repeated cycles of cryogenic
hydrogen tanking and re-entry heat year after year.
It
may be claimed that NASA could not have stayed in the manned
spaceflight business without the shuttle. This may have been true from
the point of view of lunar spaceflight. In the absence of a Soviet
program to go to the moon, there may indeed have been no support for
Apollo follow-on missions. But certainly the desire to keep up with the
Soviets would have kept America in manned spaceflight. Ever more
sophisticated Skylab space stations would have been flown. And if
America had retained the Saturn V and Apollo, the Russians would
certainly have been motivated to pursue a more aggressive space
program, to continue their own lunar base and large space station
plans. So not cancelling Apollo paradoxically would have provided the
competitive political underpinning for continuing it…
Nuff said I think.
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